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CONSENSUS THEORIES. AN ORIENTED SURVEY 
Olivier HUDRY1, Bernard MONJARDET2 
RÉSUMÉ – Théories du consensus. Une synthèse orientée 
Cet article présente une vue d’ensemble de sept directions de recherche en théorie du consensus : 
résultats arrowiens, règles d’agrégation définies au moyen de fédérations, règles définies au moyen de 
distances, solutions de tournoi, domaines restreints, théories abstraites du consensus, questions de 
complexité et d’algorithmique. Ce panorama est orienté dans la mesure où il présente principalement – 
mais non exclusivement – les travaux les plus significatifs obtenus – quelquefois avec d’autres 
chercheurs – par une équipe de chercheurs français qui sont ou ont été membres pléniers ou associés du 
Centre d’analyse et de mathématique sociale (CAMS). 
MOTS-CLÉS – Complexité, Demi-treillis à médianes, Distances, Domaines restreints, Médiane, 
Règles d’agrégation, Résultats arrowiens, Solutions de tournoi, Théories du consensus, Valuations 
inférieures 
SUMMARY – This article surveys seven directions of consensus theories: Arrowian results, 
federation consensus rules, metric consensus rules, tournament solutions, restricted domains, abstract 
consensus theories, algorithmic and complexity issues. This survey is oriented in the sense that it is 
mainly – but not exclusively – concentrated on the most significant results obtained, sometimes with other 
researchers, by a team of French researchers who are or were full or associate members of the Centre 
d’analyse et de mathématique sociale (CAMS). 
KEYWORDS – Aggregation rules, Arrowian results, Complexity, Consensus theories, Lower 
valuations, Median, Median semilattice, Metric consensus rules, Restricted domains, Tournament 
solutions 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Let us specify the contents of this paper. By consensus theory, we mean any theory 
dealing with a problem where several “objects” must be merged into one (or several) 
“consensus object(s)” of the same or of similar nature that in some sense represent(s) 
them at best. This type of problem appears first with the problem of means in statistics. 
Here the objects are numbers (the elements of a statistical series) and the aim is to find 
a number summarizing this series as well as possible (classical answers are the 
arithmetical mean, the median or the mode). In social choice theory and multiple 
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criteria decision aid, the objects can be preferences expressed by voters or through 
criteria. These preferences can be modelled by – crisp or fuzzy – binary relations like –
 crisp or fuzzy – orders (of various kinds); they can also be represented by utility 
functions. One can also consider the case where voters’ preferences are expressed via 
choice functions. In cluster analysis, the objects to aggregate can be classifications, like 
partitions (or, equivalently, equivalence relations) or hierarchies (also called n-trees). 
They can also be functions like ultrametrics. In biomathematics, the objects can be 
unrooted trees or molecular sequences. In computer science, they can be rankings given 
by Web search engines. Merging symbolic objects is a topic of artificial intelligence. 
There is a large amount of practices and literature in sport to aggregate the scores given 
by judges (or obtained on several criteria) on the performances of the athletes. Finally, 
the recently largely developed topic of “judgment aggregation” appears at least as soon 
as 1785 with Condorcet’s Essai sur l’application de l’analyse à la probabilité des 
décisions rendues à la pluralité des voix [1785]. 
This survey deals with seven main directions in consensus theories that will be 
examined in the following sections. 
1. Arrowian results. Arrow’s theorem [1951] shows that imposing some a priori 
desirable properties to an aggregation function may lead to a very unsatisfactory 
rule, namely a “dictatorship”, in which the consensus object is the object provided by 
the “dictator”3. In fact, if we add, as a condition for the rule, that it must not be 
dictatorial or – more generally – “oligarchic”, one often gets impossibility results. 
Since then, many other impossibility results have been obtained from this 
“axiomatic” approach. 
2. Federation consensus rules. These rules are the generalization of the classical 
majority rule promoted by Condorcet. In the majority rule applied to the preferences 
of voters, an alternative x is collectively preferred to another alternative y if a 
majority of voters prefers x to y. Now, this rule is extended by replacing the family 
of usual majorities by a family (called federation) of generalized majorities. For 
instance, we can take the family of all the subsets of voters with a size greater than 
or equal to a given integer q, obtaining thus the so-called quota rules. But like the 
majority rule, these federation rules can lead to unsatisfactory consensus objects. 
Recall that the majority rule applied to preferences can lead to an “effet Condorcet” 
(see Example 1 in Section 5), i.e. to cycles a > b > c > a in the collective preference, 
where x > y means that x is preferred to y by a majority. 
3. Metric consensus rules. If one reckons that a consensus rule does not need to satisfy 
all Arrow’s axioms and especially the independence axiom, many rules are available 
and in particular the metric rules. To define such a rule, the set of objects is made a 
metric space by introducing a notion of distance between (any) two objects. Then, 
based on this distance, we define a remoteness function between an n-tuple of these 
objects and any object. The consensus objects of an n-tuple are those minimizing this 
remoteness. Section 4 develops particularly the most known metric rule, namely the 
so-called median procedure. 
4. Tournament solutions. A tournament is a binary relation T such that, for any distinct 
elements x and y, we have one and only one of the following two possibilities: x is 
preferred to y according to T (xTy) or y is preferred to x according to T (yTx). A 
                                                
3 In fact, such a dictator is called an absolute dictator and it is obtained when the preferences are linear 
orders. In Arrow’s theorem on complete preorders, the dictator imposes only his strict preference (and 
not his indifference) between two alternatives. 
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transitive tournament is a (strict) linear order and conversely. Such a structure can be 
used to summarize the result of a pairwise comparison method when there is no tie. 
Such a tournament may be transitive; it is then a linear order and it is natural to 
consider that the first element of the linear order is the winner of the pairwise 
comparison method. It is more difficult and thus more disputable to determine a 
winner when the tournament is not transitive. The aim of tournament solutions is to 
determine a winner from a tournament, sometimes to rank all the elements to which 
the pairwise comparison method is applied. 
5. Restricted domains. Another classical way to escape impossibility Arrowian 
theorems is to restrict the domain of objects to aggregate. In particular, there is a big 
amount of literature on this topic in social choice theory and we will present results 
related to the case where preferences are modelled by linear orders. 
6. Abstract consensus theories. It was observed that very similar consensus results 
appear in different fields. For instance, there are “oligarchic” results in the 
aggregation of orders, choice functions or partitions. This fostered the researchers to 
find aggregation results on more “abstract” objects in order to generalize and unify 
those obtained in particular domains. 
7. Complexity issues. From a practical point of view, the algorithmic complexity of a 
method plays an essential role; for instance for an election, it is quite important to be 
able to declare who is the winner in a “reasonable” time. In this respect, polynomial 
methods are usually preferable to exponential methods. Indeed for an exponential 
method the CPU time may quickly become prohibitive if we want to compute an 
exact solution. Now when a problem is NP-hard (or NP-complete if we deal with a 
decision problem, i.e. a problem in which a question is set with “yes” or “no” as its 
answer), the only methods known nowadays to solve the problem exactly are 
exponential. It is thus quite important to know whether the considered problem is 
polynomial or NP-hard. 
On the other hand, this survey is oriented since we will mainly – but not 
exclusively – survey the most significant contributions of a team of researchers4 who 
are or were full or associate members of the “Centre d’analyse et de mathématique 
sociale” (CAMS) at the “École des hautes études en sciences sociales” (EHESS)5. 
These contributions are contained in some of the about one hundred papers written by 
them (often in cooperation with other – French or not – searchers) on consensus 
problems6. These papers were published from 1952 and the first ones were generally 
written in French, which can explain that they remained rather unknown7. Moreover, 
since this paper will be published in a special issue of Mathématiques et Sciences 
humaines in Bruno Leclerc’s honour, we will particularly develop his contributions. A 
much more exhaustive survey on a large part of the literature on consensus theories up 
to 2003 can be found in Day and McMorris’s excellent book Axiomatic Consensus 
                                                
4 Barbut, Barbut-Le Conte de Poly, Barthélemy, Bermond, Chameni-Nembua, Domenach, Guilbaud, 
Feldman-Högaasen, Hudry, Leclerc, Monjardet, Raderanirina, Rosenstiehl. 
5 Obviously, this survey is still less a survey on the contributions of French searchers on consensus 
theories. Since Borda and Condorcet, there are many of them: without attempting to be exhaustive, let us 
mention Caen’s team in social choice theory around Maurice Salles (Lepelley, Mbih, Merlin, Vidu…) 
and people like Bloch, Bordes, Bouyssou, Demange, Dubois, Grabisch, Guénoche, Kolm, Laffond, 
Lainé, Lang, Laslier,Lebreton, Mongin, Moulin, Perny, Prade, Roy, Tallon, Trannoy... For details on the 
CAMS, see [Monjardet, 2005]. 
6 The list of these papers up to 2003 can be found in [Monjardet 2005]. 
7 It is stranger for some other papers written in English, published in reputed international journals and 
containing significant results.  
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Theory in Group Choice and Biomathematics [2003]. An older survey for the consensus 
of classifications is [Leclerc, 1998]. A recent survey on the main aspects of the median 
procedure is [Hudry, Leclerc, Monjardet and Barthélemy, 2009], whereas related 
surveys on the linear ordering problem are [Charon and Hudry, 2007a and 2010]. 
Finally, a survey on the complexity of voting procedures is [Hudry, 2009(a)]. 
Remark. Unless stated otherwise, all the mathematical objects considered in this paper 
are finite. 
2. ARROWIAN RESULTS 
The “axiomatic” approach initiated by Arrow for complete preorders8 was used for 
many other objects. As soon as 1952, Guilbaud [1952] uses it for judgment aggregation 
(see Section 7). Brown [1975] uses it for orders and Mirkin [1975] for partitions. 
Barthélemy [1982] uses it when the domain and the codomain of the aggregation 
function are sets of orders. He assumes that the domain is sufficiently large, in the sense 
that, for any triple of alternatives, it contains all the possible orders (except maybe the 
trivial one). Then he shows that when this domain is included in the codomain, the only 
aggregation functions satisfying the independence condition9 and the weak Pareto 
principle10 are the absolute dictatorships or the absolute oligarchies11. 
We said above that the preferences of an individual can also be expressed by a 
choice function. The aggregation of choice functions was first studied by the Russian 
school (Aizerman, Aleskerov, Malishevsky…; see for instance [Aleskerov, 1999]). 
Monjardet and Raderanirina [2004] study the latticial structure of some significant 
classes of choice functions. Then, using the latticial approach presented below in 
Section 7, they obtain axiomatic results on the aggregation of choice functions in these 
classes. 
In cluster analysis, Mirkin [1975] was the first to use the axiomatic method for 
the case of partitions and to obtain an oligarchic result. His result was improved by 
Leclerc [1984] as a by-product of his significant theorem on the consensus of valued 
preorders. A valued preorder (or valued quasi-order) on a set X is a map p: X2 → R+ 
satisfying, for all (x, y, z) ∈ X3, p(x, z) ≤ max(p(x, y), p(y, z)) and, for every x ∈ X, p(x, 
x) = 0. So, the valued preorders are – under duality – identical to the fuzzy preorders 
satisfying maxmin transitivity [Zadeh, 1971]. On the other hand, a symmetric valued 
                                                
8 A complete preorder R (called ordering by Arrow and also called weak order, weak ordering, complete 
pre-ordering, complete quasi-ordering, linear preorder, ranking, etc.) is a complete (we must have xRy or 
yRx) and transitive (xRy and yRz imply xRz) binary relation. An antisymmetric (xRy and yRx imply x = y) 
complete preorder is a linear order. An order is a reflexive (xRx), antisymmetric and transitive binary 
relation; so, an order is a linear order if and only if it is complete. 
9 The independence condition says that if the preferences restricted to two alternatives of two profiles are 
the same, then the collective preference for these profiles on these alternatives must be the same. This 
condition (with some variants) can be stated for any consensus function. 
10 The weak Pareto principle says that the aggregation function must preserve the unanimous preferences 
of the voters. 
11 In an absolute oligarchic rule, the consensus object is completely determined only by some voters. For 
instance, when the objects are orders, the consensus object is the intersection of the orders given by these 
voters (i.e. their unanimous preferences). 
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preorder, i.e. satisfying p(x, y) = p(y, x), is an ultrametric distance12. The set V of all 
valued preorders is ordered by the pointwise order on functions and closed with respect 
to the usual join operation: p∨p′(x, y) = max(p(x, y), p′(x, y)). Leclerc defines two 
“Arrow-like” axioms for the aggregation of valued preorders. Let F be a map Vn → V 
and let p (respectively, p′) denote the image F(Π) (respectively, F(Π′)) of a profile Π = 
(p1, …, pn) (respectively, Π′) of valued preorders; these axioms are: 
Efficiency: for every profile Π ∈ Vn and all (x, y) ∈ X2, 
max p(x, y) ≤ maxi∈{1, 2, …, n} pi(x, y). 
Binariness: for all the profiles (Π, Π′) ∈ (Vn)2 and (x, y) ∈ X2, 
pi(x, y) = p′i(x, y) for i ∈ {1, 2, …, n} implies p(x, y) = p′(x, y). 
We may observe that these axioms are generalizations of classical Paretian and 
independence axioms. Then, Leclerc obtains the following result (where º is the 
composition operation of two maps): 
THEOREM 1. A consensus function F: Vn → V satisfies the efficiency and binariness 
properties if and only if there exist n reductive and isotone13 maps f1,…, fn from R+ into 
itself such that F(Π) = (f1 º p1) ∨ (f2 º p2) ∨…∨(fn º pn). 
Replacing R+ by the set {0, 1} ordered by <, Leclerc shows that the following 
results are particular cases of Theorem 1: Mas-Collel and Sonnenschein’s result [1972] 
on complete preorders14, Brown’s result [1975] on orders, Mirkin’s result [1981] on 
preorders. Moreover he obtains a form of Arrow’s 1951 theorem. Other particular cases 
deal with cluster analysis where Leclerc obtains – as already noticed – an improvement 
of Mirkin’s 1975 theorem on partitions15 and a result on the consensus of ultrametrics. 
On the other hand, the above result is considerably extended in [Leclerc, 1991]. Here, 
valued preorders are replaced by much more general valued objects16 defined by maps 
from a lattice of objects into a lattice of values. The set of these valued objects is itself a 
lattice (isomorphic to a lattice of Galois maps17) and so, one can apply, and above all 
particularize to this case, the results of the latticial consensus theory described in 
Section 7. Then, consensus functions called extensively oligarchic (dual generalizations 
of the above map F) are characterized. 
For the case of hierarchies18 in cluster analysis, variants of Arrow’s independence 
axiom lead to characterizations of dictatorship and absolute dictatorships consensus 
                                                
12 Ultrametrics are significant in cluster analysis since they induce a chain of nested (and indexed) 
partitions.  
13 A map f from R+ into R+ is reductive if f(x) ≤ x and isotone if x ≤ y implies f(x) ≤ f(y). 
14 Mas-Collel and Sonnenschein’s result deals with the aggregation of complete preorders into the so-
called quasi-transitive relations, i.e. the complete relations for which the asymmetric part is an order.  
15 This improved form was found again by [Fishburn and Rubinstein, 1986]; see [Barthélemy 1988a].  
16 They could as well be called fuzzy objects, but in the paper they are rather strangely called valued 
preferences. 
17 A Galois map between two lattices is a map f such that f(x∨y) = f(x∧y) and f(0) = 1. 
18 A hierarchy – also called n-tree – on a set E is a family H of subsets (called classes or clusters) of E 
such that if two classes have a nonempty intersection, then one of these classes is contained in the other. 
One also assumes that E and all the singletons are classes and that the empty set is not a class. 
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rules [Barthélemy and McMorris, 1989], [Barthélemy, McMorris and Powers, 1991, 
1992]. 
The above Arrowian results are often “negative” since, by adding as a condition 
for the rule that it must not have a dictatorial or oligarchic form, we often obtain 
impossibility results. The Arrowian approach leads to more positive results when it 
comes to axiomatic characterizations of interesting consensus rules, a line of research 
initiated by May as soon as 1952 for the majority rule [May, 1952]. Several such results 
will be presented in the following sections. 
3. FEDERATION CONSENSUS RULES 
A federation (also called simple game19) F on a set N is a family F of subsets of N 
(called coalitions) closed under supersets: 
∀ S ⊆ N and ∀ U ⊆ N, [S ∈ F and S ⊆ U] ⇒ [U ∈ F]. 
Federations allow defining consensus rules for many objects. For instance, let N = {1, 2, 
..., n} be a set of n voters choosing their preference relations in a set of relations defined 
on a set A and let Π = (R1, R2, ..., Rn) be a profile of relations. For (x, y) ∈ A2, we set: 
NΠ(x, y) = {i ∈ N: xRiy} and nΠ(x, y) = |NΠ(x, y)|. 
Then, the collective preference relation RF(Π) associated with the federation F and the 
profile Π is given by: 
∀ (x, y) ∈  A2, [xRF(Π)y] ⇔ [NΠ(x, y) ∈ F]. 
So, we take as the consensus relation the ordered pairs unanimously present in at least a 
coalition, what can also be written: 
RF(Π) = ∪S∈F {∩{Ri, i ∈ S}} 
(a formulation that will be generalized in Section 7). 
The usual majority rule is obtained by considering the federation formed by all 
the majority coalitions, i.e. the coalitions of size greater than n/2. More generally, the 
so-called quota rules are defined by an integer q and the federation 
Fq = {S ⊆ N: |S| ≥ q}. 
By increasing the quota q, we put in the consensus relation ordered pairs less and less 
frequent in the relations of the profile. In the extreme case where q = n, we obtain the 
Pareto (or unanimity) rule where the consensus relation keeps only the unanimous 
ordered pairs. 
We find again the oligarchic rules of the previous section (see footnote 11) by 
taking a filter, i.e. the set of supersets of a fixed set M ⊆ N, as the federation. If the set 
                                                
19 This last appellation is due to von Neumann and Morgenstern who use this structure in their theory of 
games. It is unfortunate that it went on again in the different context of social choice theory. The better 
term of federation is due to Mirkin [1981]. 
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M is reduced to a singleton {i}, i.e. if the filter is an ultrafilter, we obtain an (absolute) 
dictatorship, since the consensus relation is Ri. 
Guilbaud [1952] was the first to use federations (called families of generalized 
majorities by him). He stated an Arrowian theorem for judgment aggregation (see 
Section 7) by essentially proving that Arrowian conditions required for a federation 
consensus rule imply that the federation is an ultrafilter20. 
In [Monjardet, 1978], federation21 rules are used for tournaments. The problem of 
aggregating tournaments occurs for instance with the paired comparison method in 
socio-psychology. When a subject is asked to give all his binary preferences between 
some objects, the result can contain intransitivities, as a > b > c > a. So, when the 
subject must express strict preferences (indifference and abstention are excluded), the 
result is a tournament. In [Monjardet, 1978], several axiomatically-defined aggregation 
rules on tournaments are characterized as rules defined by federations. As a by-product, 
one obtains a Galois connexion22 showing the duality between Arrow’s theorem and 
Ward’s theorem23 for linear orders. 
The general problem with the federation consensus rules is that the consensus 
object may be unsatisfactory. First, it may not belong to the class of considered objects 
(for instance, the majority rule on linear orders may produce a non-transitive 
tournament). But, even if it is not the case, the consensus object may remain 
unsatisfying. For instance, in cluster analysis, the unanimity rule applied to hierarchies 
is often called the strict rule. This rule, like more generally other quota rules, gives a 
hierarchy but which may miss some structural features of the aggregated hierarchies 
and, in particular, the fact that two elements of the set E of elements to classify may be 
put together in all the hierarchies before to be joined by a third element. Then, one 
would wish that these two elements appear in some cluster of the consensus hierarchy 
not containing the third element. The celebrated Adams’s rule [Adams, 1986] achieves 
this wish. First, Adams associates a nesting relation on the subsets of E with any 
hierarchy and conversely. Then, given a profile of hierarchies, the consensus hierarchy 
is this one corresponding with the intersection of all the nesting relations associated 
with the hierarchies of the profile. The one-to-one correspondence between hierarchies 
and nesting relations has been generalized to a one-to-one correspondence between 
Moore families24 and overhanging relations by Domenach and Leclerc [2004(a), 
2004(b), 2007]. The problem to aggregate Moore families occurs in several fields and 
raises the same type of difficulties as the above problem for hierarchies. Then, Adams’s 
method can be generalized by using quota rules on the overhanging relations associated 
with a profile of Moore families. But the obtained relation is not necessarily an 
                                                
20 For the use of ultrafilters in social choice theory, see [Monjardet, 1983]. 
21 Here a federation is called a family of majorities and it satisfies an additional condition: a coalition 
belongs to the family F if and only if the complementary coalition does not belong to F. 
22 For all terms of order or lattice theories not defined here, see for instance [Davey and Priestley, 2001] 
and [Caspard, Leclerc and Monjardet, 2007]. 
23 A cyclic triple of preferences on three objects a, b, c is a triple such as: a > b > c, b > c > a and 
c > a > b. Ward’s theorem says that majority rule applied on linear orders belonging to a set of linear 
orders always provides an order if and only if this set does not contain cyclic triples. 
24 A Moore family (also called a closure system) on a set N is a family F of subsets of N (the closed sets) 
closed by intersection and containing the set N. By adding the empty set to a hierarchy, this one becomes 
a closure system. 
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overhanging relation. Nevertheless, one can show that there exists at most a unique 
overhanging relation containing this relation and satisfying another desirable condition 
[Leclerc, 2004], [Domenach and Leclerc 2004(b)]. Now, when this overhanging 
relation exists, one can come back to a Moore family. If one applies this method to 
aggregate Moore families of a special class, one still needs to obtain a Moore family of 
the same type. It is shown in [Domenach, 2010] that it is indeed the case for some 
classes of Moore families. 
4. METRIC CONSENSUS RULES 
The most known metric rule is the so-called Kemeny rule defined for complete 
preorders in [Kemeny, 1959]. Kemeny defines a measure of distance between two 
complete preorders as the number of their disagreements25. This measure is actually a 
distance since it is nothing else than the well-known symmetric difference distance. 
Then, Kemeny defines the remoteness between a profile of complete preorders and a 
complete preorder as the sum of the distances between this complete preorder and those 
in the profile. Finally, he defines the consensus complete preorders of a profile as the 
complete preorders minimizing the remoteness to this profile. His paper contains also 
an axiomatic characterization of the symmetric difference distance between complete 
preorders. Barthélemy [1979, see also 1981] improves it in a paper containing 
characterizations of this same distance for the most used sets of relations and where he 
also shows the independence of the considered axioms. 
Any set of binary relations (and, more generally of sets) endowed with the 
symmetric difference distance becomes a metric space. In a metric space, a “point” 
minimizing the sum of its distances to an n-tuple of other points is classically called a 
(metric) median of these points. Then, Kemeny’s rule is a particular case of what has 
been called the median procedure26 to define consensus objects. In the case of arbitrary 
binary relations, this procedure has been independently proposed by Barbut [1967] and 
Mirkin [1974]. Both authors observe that the majority (or Condorcet) relation of a 
profile of (arbitrary) relations is a median of this profile. But, this procedure is a 
“multiprocedure” in the sense that a profile has generally several medians. And 
generally the computation of median objects amounts to solve difficult combinatorial 
optimisation problems (see Section 8). 
Consider first the case where the objects are linear orders. In this case, one can 
observe that the median procedure can be defined in many other ways (sixteen are 
presented in [Monjardet, 1990(b)]). For instance, in statistics, a classic concordance 
coefficient between the linear orders of a profile is the so-called Kendall-Ehrenberg’s 
coefficient U. This coefficient is formed by the mean of Kendall’s tau on the pairs of 
linear orders of the profile. But since Kendall’s tau is a normalization of the symmetric 
                                                
25 Two complete preorders have two (respectively, one) disagreement(s) for the pair {x, y} if one prefers 
x to y and the other y to x (respectively, is indifferent between x and y). In the case of linear orders where 
the number of disagreements can only be equal to 0 or 2 for each pair, half this distance normalized 
between –1 and +1 is Kendall’s tau, well-known to the statisticians [Kendall, 1938]. 
26 For a survey on the median procedure up to 1988, see [Barthélemy and Monjardet, 1981 and 1988]. 
For historical details on the median in several (discrete or not) metric spaces, see [Monjardet, 1991 and 
2008]. 
CONSENSUS THEORIES. AN ORIENTED SURVEY 
 
147 
difference distance between linear orders, computing a median order of a profile Π of 
linear orders is equivalent to computing a linear order L maximizing the coefficient 
U(Π + L) 27. Several of the many ways to define median linear orders have been 
independently proposed in the literature. In particular, arguments advanced by Guilbaud 
[1952] and Young [1988] lead to think that it was the rule proposed by Condorcet to 
palliate the “Condorcet effect” (the possible existence of cycles in the majority 
relation)28, see [Monjardet, 2005 or 2008] for details. A remarkable result is the 
axiomatic characterization of the median rule for linear orders by Young and 
Levenglick [1978] who use in particular a consistency axiom29 that we will find again 
several times. The median procedure also appeared in cluster analysis. It has been first 
used for partitions by Régnier [1965], then independently by Mirkin [1974]. The 
problems related to the computation of median relations will be examined in Section 8. 
The median procedure has been also used for hierarchies by Margush and 
McMorris [1981]. The case of hierarchies is particular since the set of all hierarchies 
(on a set) is endowed with a median semilattice structure (see Section 7). Then, median 
hierarchies can be easily obtained from the majority hierarchy [Barthélemy and 
McMorris, 1986]. In this same paper, the characterization of the median procedure for 
hierarchies, by the consistency axiom (see footnote 29) and four other axioms, is a 
particular case of the characterization of medians in a median semilattice presented in 
Section 7. A class belongs (respectively, does not belong, or may or not belong) to a 
median hierarchy of an n-tuple of hierarchies if it occurs in at least n/2 (respectively 
less than n/2, or equal to n/2) classes of the n-tuple. More generally, Barthélemy 
[1988b] defines a thresholded consensus rule by considering an interval [m, m′] of 
numbers and by setting that a class belonging to k hierarchies of a profile of hierarchies 
belongs (respectively, does not belong, or may or not belong) to a consensus hierarchy 
of this profile if k ≥ m′ (respectively k < m, or m ≤ k < m′). Then, he characterizes these 
thresholded rules. 
5. TOURNAMENT SOLUTIONS 
This section is devoted to the so-called tournament solutions (see [Laslier, 1993, 1996, 
1997] and [Moulin, 1986]) of which the aim is to determine a winner from a 
tournament. Remember that a tournament is a binary relation T such that, for any 
distinct elements x and y, we have one and only one of the following two possibilities: 
xTy or yTx (see Figure 1). Note that a transitive tournament is a (strict) linear order and 
conversely. The procedures described here (for other tournament solutions, see for 
instance [Laslier, 1996, 1997]) rather apply to unweighted tournaments, but the first 
two can be extended to weighted tournaments (see Section 5.3). 
A tournament can be used to summarize the result of a pairwise comparison 
method when there is no tie, as assumed in the sequel. For instance, if such a method is 
                                                
27 For an alike use of the Borda-Kendall coefficient, see [Monjardet, 1985 and 1997]. 
28 When there is no Condorcet effect, all the median linear orders are the linear orders containing the 
order given by the majority rule (if the number of voters is odd, there is a unique median). 
29 This consistency axiom says that if two profiles of linear orders have some identical median linear 
orders, then the profile formed by the concatenation of these two profiles must have these identical linear 
orders as its median linear orders. 
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applied in an election, then we obtain the majority tournament T = (X, A) of the 
election: the set X of vertices is the set of the candidates of the election; in the 
following, n will denote the size of X; there is a directed edge from x to y in A if x is 
preferred to y by a majority of voters. Example 1 below illustrates these considerations. 
Example 1. Assume that nine voters must rank n = 4 candidates a, b, c, and d. The 
preferences of the voters are supposed to be given by the following linear orders (where 
x > y still means that x is preferred to y by the voter): 
– the preferences of three voters are: a > b > c > d; 
– the preferences of two voters are: b > d > c > a; 
– the preference of one voter is: d > c > a > b; 
– the preference of one voter is: a > c > b > d; 
– the preference of one voter is: d > b > a > c; 
– the preference of one voter is: c > d > b > a. 
Here, the majority relation is not a linear order, but the tournament of Figure 1. 
 a b 
c d 
 
FIGURE 1. The majority tournament associated with the data of Example 1 
We shall note that, if the election summarized by T admits a Condorcet winner C, 
i.e. a candidate preferred to any other candidate by a majority of voters, the tournament 
solutions described below will select C as the unique winner. 
5.1. NUMBER OF WINS: COPELAND’S SOLUTION 
The procedure designed by A.H. Copeland30 [1951] is based on the Copeland scores. 
The Copeland score s(x) of a candidate x is the number of candidates defeated by x. 
From the graph theoretic point of view, s(x) is the outdegree of x. A Copeland winner is 
any candidate with a maximum Copeland score (we may also rank the candidates 
according to the non-increasing Copeland scores). 
Its application to Example 1 gives: s(a) = 2, s(b) = 2, s(c) = 1, s(d) = 1. Here, a 
and b are the Copeland winners. 
                                                
30 According to I. McLean, H. Lorrey and J. Colomer [2008], “Ramon Llull (ca 1232-1316) (...) made 
contributions which have been believed to be centuries more recent. Llull promotes the method of 
pairwise comparison, and proposes the Copeland rule to select a winner.” 
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5.2. LINEAR ORDERS AT MINIMUM DISTANCE: SLATER’S SOLUTION 
Slater solution [1961] allows also ranking the candidates. It consists in reversing a 
minimum number of arcs of T in order to obtain a transitive tournament O, i.e. a linear 
order, and then to consider the winner of O as a Slater winner. More precisely, let O be 
a linear order defined on X. We define the distance θ(T, O) between T and O as the 
number of arcs of T which have a different orientation in O (note that this distance is 
half the symmetric difference distance of Section 4 applied to the relations T and O). A 
Slater order of T is a linear order O* minimizing θ(T, O) over the set of the linear 
orders O defined on X. A Slater winner of T is the winner of any Slater order of T. We 
note i(T) the minimum number of arcs that must be reversed in T to get a Slater order 
O* of T: θ(T, O*) = i(T); i(T) is called the Slater index of T. 
It is easy to see that the Slater index of the tournament of Figure 1 is equal to 1: 
reversing (d, a) is sufficient to obtain a linear order, namely a > b > c > d. In fact, we 
may prove that this reversing is also necessary to obtain a linear order: thus a > b > c > 
d is the only Slater order of this tournament and a is its only Slater winner. 
Attention had been paid to combinatorial aspects of Slater’s solution. For 
instance, the maximum values that the Slater index can take, the number of Slater 
orders that a given tournament can admit, some links between Slater orders and 
Hamiltonian paths, or the construction of tournaments with a given Slater index are 
investigated in papers like [Barthélemy et al., 1995], [Bermond, 1972, 1973], [Charon 
and Hudry, 2000, 2003], [Hudry, 1997]. The links between Slater’s solution and other 
tournament solutions have also been studied. For example, Bermond [1972] showed 
that the Copeland score of a Slater winner in a tournament with n vertices is at least n/2; 
this result was generalized to weighted tournaments in [Charon et al., 1997(a)] while 
[Guénoche, 1995] provides bounds for the rank of any vertex in a Slater order, still 
based on the Copeland scores (or on the weights of the arcs of the considered 
tournament, if this one is weighted). Bermond [1972] also exhibited a tournament with 
7 vertices such that the set of Copeland winners and the one of Slater winners are 
disjoint. In fact, as pointed out in [Charon and Hudry, 2007a], the minimum number of 
vertices for such a situation to occur is 6. The Copeland scores may also be involved to 
provide bounds of the Slater index, as in [Charon et al., 1992(a)] and [Charon and 
Hudry, 2003]. More recently, Charon and Hudry [to appear] study the distance between 
Slater orders and Copeland orders (i.e., orders obtained by ranking the vertices of a 
tournament T according to the non-increasing Copeland scores of T). They show that 
there exist tournaments T admitting Slater orders OS and Copeland orders OC such that 
the distance θ(OS, OC) between these orders reaches its maximum, equal to n(n – 1)/2, 
in spite of Bermond’s [1972] result about the Copeland score of a Slater winner. 
For more detailed surveys on Slater’s solution, see [Charon et al., 1996(b)], 
[Charon and Hudry, 2007, 2010] or [Laslier, 1996, 1997]. 
5.3. EXTENSION OF SLATER’S SOLUTION TO WEIGHTED TOURNAMENTS 
If T represents the majority tournament of a pairwise comparison method applied for 
instance to an election, we may weight the arcs of T. A usual way to do this consists in 
defining the weight w(x, y) of an arc (x, y) as the difference between twice the number 
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m(x, y) of voters who prefer x to y minus the number m of voters when a majority of 
voters prefers x to y: w(x, y) = 2m(x, y) – m. Then, instead of considering the number of 
arcs that must be reversed in T to make it transitive, we may want to compute a 
minimum weighted set of arcs such that the simultaneous reversal of these arcs 
transforms T into a linear order. This allows representing the problem of aggregating 
preferences into median relations. This includes the so-called Kemeny’s problem31 
consisting in computing a median linear order, then also called a Kemeny order, i.e. a 
linear order minimizing the total number of disagreements with respect to the 
preferences of the voters when these preferences are assumed to be linear orders. 
More formally, consider an election in which m voters want to rank n candidates 
belonging to the set X. Let Π = (O1, O2, …, Om) denote the profile of the preferences of 
the m voters. Each preference Oj (1 ≤ j ≤ m) is assumed to be a linear order here, but 
more generally, it is a binary relation defined on X: Oj ⊆ X×X. For a binary relation O 
defined on X, let δ(Oj, O) be the symmetric difference distance between Oj and O: 
δ(Oj, O) = OO j! , where Δ denotes the symmetric difference between sets. We may 
interpret δ(Oj, O) as the number of disagreements between Oj and O. Then we define a 
remoteness R(Π, O) between Π and a binary relation O by R(",O) = # Oj,O
✭ ✮
j=1
m
$ . We 
may interpret R(Π, O) as the total number of disagreements between Π and O. A 
median relation is a relation O* minimizing R over a prescribed set Ω of relations 
fulfilling some structural properties: 
R(Π, O*) = ),(min OR
O
!
"#
. 
Here, all the preferences Oj (1 ≤ j ≤ m) are linear orders and Ω is the set of linear 
orders defined on X. Slater’s problem can also be stated in this way: in this case, Π 
contains only one preference (m = 1) which is a tournament T and Ω is still the set of 
linear orders defined on X; then, we may show that, for any linear order O, δ(T, O) is 
even and that we have the relations θ(T, O) = δ(T, O)/2 and, for any candidate x 
preferred to another candidate y according to T, we have w(x, y) = 1. In both cases, any 
instance of Kemeny’s problem or of Slater’s problem can be represented by a 
tournament T weighted by w(x, y) = 2m(x, y) – m, and the aim is then to reverse in T the 
orientation of arcs such that the total weight with respect to w of the reversed arcs is 
minimum while this reversing transforms T into a linear order (which will be a median 
order). 
For the data of Example 1, the weighted tournament is the one of Figure 2. This 
tournament admits only one Kemeny order: a > b > c > d, which is also a Slater order 
(but this is not true in general). 
                                                
31 Also called Kemeny’s rule. As this problem can be stated in different ways (see for instance 
[Monjardet, 1990(b)] and [Charon and Hudry, 2007, 2010]), several authors rediscovered this problem 
under different names. In fact, in Kemeny’s problem, individual preferences are complete preorders and 
the median relation should also be a complete preorder. Anyway, “Kemeny’s problem” is often the 
expression used to call the problem consisting in aggregating linear orders into a median linear order, as 
we do here. 
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 a b 
c d 
1 
1
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1 
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FIGURE 2. The weighted tournament associated with the data of Example 1 
5.4. MAXIMAL TRANSITIVE SUBTOURNAMENTS: BANKS’S SOLUTION 
Among the other tournament solutions, one was designed by J. Banks [1985]. When the 
considered tournament T is transitive (i.e., T is a linear order), there exists a unique 
winner (the Condorcet winner of the election), who is selected as the winner of T by the 
usual tournament solutions. Otherwise, we may anyway consider the transitive 
subtournaments of T which are maximal with respect to inclusion, and then select the 
winner of each of them as the winners of T. This defines the Banks’s solution: a Banks 
winner of T is the winner of any maximal (with respect to inclusion) transitive 
subtournament of T. 
If we consider the majority tournament of Example 1, there exist three Banks 
winners: a (because of the maximal transitive subtournament induced by a, b and c), b 
(because of the subtournament induced by b, c and d) and d (because of the 
subtournament induced by d and a). 
As for Slater’s solution, some papers consider the links between Banks’s solution 
and other tournament solutions. For instance, Laffond and Laslier [1991] provide a 
tournament with 75 vertices such that the set of Copeland winners, the set of Slater 
winners and the set of Banks winners are pairwise disjoint. A tournament with 16 
vertices such that the set of Slater winners and the set of Banks winners are disjoint can 
be found in [Charon et al., 1997(b)], while another tournament with 14 vertices 
satisfying the same property has been exhibited by Östergård and Vaskelainen [2010]. 
Nonetheless, the minimum number of vertices required to reach this property remains 
unknown. It is not the case for the disjunction between the set of Copeland winners and 
the one of Banks winners: it is shown in [Hudry, 1999] that the minimum number of 
vertices for this property is equal to 13. 
6. RESTRICTED DOMAINS 
A set of linear orders is a Condorcet domain (called also acyclic or consistent domain) 
if the strict majority rule applied to any profile of linear orders of this set always leads 
to an order. The best known example of Condorcet domain is the single-peaked domain 
defined by Black [1948]. Its definition requires defining a reference linear order L 
considered as the “objective” order over the alternatives. It is then also called the 
domain of L-unimodal linear orders. Guilbaud [1952] provides an analysis of the single-
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peaked domain showing that the set of single-peaked linear orders has a distributive 
lattice structure32 and that the majority relation of a profile in this domain is the median 
of the orders of the profile in this lattice. 
Using another paper by Guilbaud and Rosenstiehl [1963], Chameni-Nembua 
[1989] generalizes this result. Indeed, Guilbaud and Rosenstiehl show that the set L of 
linear orders can be endowed with a lattice structure called the “permutoèdre” lattice33. 
This lattice has an arbitrary linear order L as its greatest element and the dual of L as its 
least element. The unoriented covering relation of this lattice is the adjacency relation 
where two linear orders are adjacent if they differ on a unique pair of elements. The 
permutoèdre lattice is not distributive but it contains distributive sublattices. A 
sublattice of L is said to be covering if the covering relation (see footenote 38) in this 
sublattice is the same as the covering relation in L. Then, Chameni-Nembua proved that 
any distributive covering sublattice of the permutoèdre lattice L is a Condorcet domain. 
Indeed, in this distributive lattice, the majority relation of a profile of n (odd integer) 
linear orders is the metric (and algebraic, see Section 7) median of these n orders. 
Related results were obtained by Abello [1985, for instance] and Fishburn [1997, for 
instance]. Finally, Galambos and Reiner [2008] provide a general theorem – unifying 
all the previous results – on the Condorcet domains that are distributive covering 
sublattices of the permutoèdre lattice. A survey on all these results can be found in 
[Monjardet, 2009]. 
7. ABSTRACT CONSENSUS THEORIES 
To begin this section, we cannot do better that quoting the following excerpt of the 
introduction of Barthélemy and Janowitz’s paper [1991]: “since Arrow’s 1951 theorem, 
there has been a flurry of activity designed to prove analogues of this theorem in other 
contexts, and to establish contexts in which the rather dismaying consequences of this 
theorem are not necessarily valid. The resulting theories have developed somewhat 
independently in a number of disciplines, and one often sees the same theorem proved 
differently in different contexts. What is needed is a general mathematical model in 
which these matters may be disposed of in a common setting. That is to say, we forget 
about the exact nature of the objects and, using some abstract structure on various sets 
of objects under consideration, concern ourselves instead with ways in which the 
structure can be used to summarize a given family of objects”. Proceeding in this 
manner, there are two main approaches. Rubinstein and Fishburn’s approach [1986], 
following a line initiated by Wilson [1975], uses linear algebra. The other approach 
uses ordered structures and it has been followed by several researchers of the Centre 
d’analyse et de mathématique sociale. 
Recall that a meet semilattice L is a partially ordered set such that the meet (i.e. 
the greatest lower bound) x∧y of any two elements x and y of L exists (then, the meet of 
any finite subset of L exists). Dually, a join semilattice is a partially ordered set L such 
that the join (i.e. the lowest upper bound) x∨y of any two elements x and y of L exists. A 
                                                
32 For the definitions concerning lattices, see the following section.  
33 They considered also sublattices of this lattice as negotiation intervals between the preferences of two 
voters, an idea generalized in [Feldman-Högaasen, 1969]. 
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lattice is a meet and join semilattice. Observe that many sets of binary relations are 
(semi)lattices for the operations of set intersection ∩ and set union ∪. Two lines of 
researches were followed. The first one develops an axiomatic theory of consensus in 
(semi)lattices. The second develops the study of the median operation in 
(semi)lattices34. 
In any partially ordered set, an element is formed from simpler elements: it is the 
join (respectively, the meet) of the so-called join-irreducible (respectively, of the so-
called meet-irreducible) elements, i.e. of the elements not join of elements strictly lesser 
(respectively, not meet of elements strictly greater) than themselves35. In [Monjardet, 
1990(a)] and [Leclerc and Monjardet, 1995], it is shown that the form of the consensus 
functions defined by the same axioms on a lattice strongly depends on the properties of 
this lattice, and in particular on a dependence relation δ defined on its join-irreducible 
elements by: 
j δ j'  if  j ≠ j' and there exists x ∈ L such that j, j' ≰ x  and  j < j'∨x 
They obtain the following result: 
THEOREM 2. Let L be a finite lattice and F: Ln → L a consensus function. 
(1) If L is distributive36, then F is a federation consensus function if and only if F is 
neutral monotonic. 
(2) If L is not distributive, then F is a meet projection (oligarchic) consensus function 
if and only if it is neutral. 
(3) If L is strong, then F is a meet projection (oligarchic) consensus function if and 
only if it is decisive and Paretian. 
The axioms involved in this theorem are straightforward generalizations of 
independence, monotonicity, neutrality and Pareto axioms used in social choice theory. 
A federation consensus function is a function defined as in Section 3 by a federation F 
on the set N of “voters”. Let Π = (x1, x2, …, xn) be an n-tuple of elements of L. Then: 
F(Π) = ∨A∈F (∧i∈A xi). 
We may see that this formulation is the same as in Section 3, the operations of set 
union and intersection being replaced by the join and meet operations of a lattice. And, 
by replacing the ordered pairs by the join-irreducible elements, we may also write, like 
in Section 3: 
∀ j ∈ J, [j ∈ F(Π)] ⇔ [NΠ(j) ∈ F], 
where NΠ(j) = {i ∈ N: j ∈ xi}.  
                                                
34 [Barthélemy, Leclerc and Monjardet, 1986] provides a survey up to 1986 on these two research lines 
and their applications to the comparison and to the consensus of classifications. 
35 For instance, in the lattice of all binary relations, the join-irreducible elements are the relations 
containing a unique ordered pair (x,y) and, in the meet semilattice of orders, the meet-irreducible 
elements are the linear orders. 
36 A lattice L is distributive if each one of the meet and join operations is distributive over the other, for 
instance if, for all (x, y, z) ∈ L3, x∧(y∨z) = (x∧y)∨(x∧z) (this distributivity of the meet operation over the 
join operation implies the distributivity of the join operation over the meet operation, and conversely). 
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In case (1) of Theorem 2, the lattice is distributive, which is equivalent to say that 
its dependence relation reduces to the order relation existing between its join-
irreducible elements37. Then, there are as many neutral, monotonic consensus functions 
as there are federations (simple games) on N. But as soon as the lattice L is no longer 
distributive, the same axioms reduce the class of admissible functions strongly: there 
exists a (nonempty) subset A of N such that F(Π) = ∧i∈A xi (which means that the only 
admissible federations are those formed by the supersets of a nonempty subset of N). 
Finally, when L is strong, i.e. when the dependence relation is strongly connected, the 
decisivity and Paretian axioms imply the stronger axiom of neutral monotonicity. The 
above result is in fact a particular case of a more general result obtained for 
semilattices. 
Since first Barbut’s works [1961, 1969], the abstract latticial approach has also 
been developed much for metric consensus. In this case, we have a meet (or a join) 
semilattice L endowed with a distance d. Several distances are possible and the most 
usual, used below, generalizes the symmetric difference distance. Axiomatic 
characterizations of these distances can be found in [Barthélemy, 1979], [Monjardet, 
1981] and [Barthélemy, Leclerc and Monjardet, 1986]. 
Let Π = (x1, x2, …, xn) be an n-tuple of elements of L. The remoteness of an 
element x of L from Π (with respect to the distance d) is: 
R(Π, x) = ∑i∈N d(x, xi). 
A median of Π (with respect to the distance d) is any element of L minimizing 
this remoteness; it is called a Π-median. The set of Π-medians is denoted by MedLΠ. 
Observe that, since there generally exist several medians, the median rule is a map from 
Ln to 2L, so defining a multi-consensus rule. 
On the other hand, several “majority” elements can be associated with Π, 
obtained by using different forms of the majority rule. Let J (respectively, J′) be the set 
of join-irreducible (respectively, meet-irreducible) elements of L. We set: 
C(Π) = {j ∈ J: |{i ∈ N: j ≤ xi}| > n/2}, C′(Π) = {j′ ∈ J′: |{i ∈ N: j′ ≥ xi}| > n/2}, 
B(Π) = {j ∈ J: |{i ∈ N: j ≤ xi}| ≥ n/2}, B′(Π) = {j′ ∈ J′: |{i ∈ N: j′ ≥ xi}| ≥ n/2} 
and 
c(Π) = ∨C(Π) ; c′(Π) = ∧C′(Π) ; b(Π) = ∨B(Π) ; b′(Π) = ∧B′(Π). 
In a semilattice, some of these elements may not exist. For the existing elements, 
we have c(Π) ≤ b(Π) ≤ c′(Π) and c(Π) ≤ b′(Π) ≤ c′(Π). If n is odd, we have c(Π) = 
b(Π) and b′(Π) = c′(Π). If L is a distributive lattice, we have c(Π) = b′(Π) and c′(Π) = 
b(Π). 
The reason to consider these majority elements will become clear below. We take 
as distance a straightforward generalization of the symmetric difference distance 
previously used in Section 4. This generalization uses the join-irreducible 
                                                
37 For any partially ordered set P, there exists a distributive lattice such that the poset of its join-
irreducible elements is isomorphic to P.  
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representation of the elements mentioned above. Let x be an element of a semilattice L; 
set Jx = {j ∈ J: j ≤ x} (thus, x = ∨Jx). Now write, for any (x, x′) belonging to L2: 
δ(x, x′) = |Jx∆ Jx′ | = |Jx∪ Jx′ | – |Jx∩ Jx′ | = |{j ∈ J: [j ∈ Jx and j ∉ Jx′ ] or [j ∉ Jx and j 
∈ Jx′ ]}|. 
A meet semilattice L is said to be lower distributive if, for any x ∈ L, the lattice 
{x′ ∈ L: x′ ≤ x} is distributive (see footnote 36). A median semilattice [Avann, 1961] is 
a lower distributive meet semilattice L in which, for all (x1, x2, x3) ∈ L3, x1∨x2∨x3 exists 
as soon as the three elements x1∨x2, x1∨x3 and x2∨x3 all exist. In such a median 
semilattice, the element (x∧x′ )∨(x′∧x″ )∨(x″∧x) exists for any (x, x′, x″) ∈ L3 and is 
called the (algebraic) median of these three elements. Then, it can be shown that, for  
Π = (x1, x2, …, xn), the (algebraic) median of Π, i.e. the element c(Π), also exists (but 
not necessarily the element b(Π)). If a median semilattice is a lattice, it is a distributive 
lattice. When L is a median semilattice, the medians of a profile with respect to the 
metric δ can be easily obtained from the majority elements, as shown in the result below. 
This characterization of medians with respect to δ in a median semilattice [Bandelt and 
Barthélemy,1984] generalizes a series of results on medians in distributive lattices 
[Birkhoff and Kiss, 1947], [Barbut, 1961], [Monjardet, 1980]: 
THEOREM 3. Let L be a median semilattice and Π ∈ Ln be a profile of L. If n is odd, 
then c(Π) is the unique Π-median; if n is even, then the set of all Π-medians with 
respect to the symmetric difference distance metric δ is MedL(Π) = {∨K: C(Π) ⊆ K ⊆ 
B(Π) and ∨K exists}. 
In particular, in a distributive lattice, the set of all Π-medians is the median 
interval [c(Π), b(Π)] = {x ∈ L: c(Π) ≤ x ≤ b(Π)} [Monjardet, 1980]. If n is odd, c(Π) = 
b(Π) is the unique median. The fact that these properties characterize distributive 
lattices can be obtained from the following more general result due to Leclerc [1990], 
where the distance used is the distance dsp of the shortest path38: 
THEOREM 4. A lattice is upper semimodular39 if and only if, for any profile Π and for 
any Π-median m (with respect to the distance dsp), the inequality c(Π) ≤ m holds. 
Observe that this result gives a lower bound for medians (with respect to dsp) in 
the case of an upper semimodular lattice. This is significant since, except for the median 
semilattice case, medians may be difficult to compute. Continuing this line of research, 
Leclerc gave many results on medians with respect to other metrics and other 
semilattices. A usual way to define metrics on semilattices (and more generally on 
partially ordered sets) is to use valuations. Let v be a strictly isotone (i.e. x < y implies 
v(x) < v(y)) real map on a meet semilattice L. The map v is a lower valuation if it satisfies 
the following property whenever x∨y exists: 
                                                
38 Let p be the covering relation of L: x p y whenever x ≤ z < y implies x = z. Setting xEy if x p y or y p x 
defines an undirected graph (L, E). The distance dsp between x and y is the minimum length of a path 
between x and y in this graph. 
39 A lattice L is upper (respectively, lower) semimodular if, for all (x, y, z) ∈ L3, x∧y p x and x∧y p y 
imply (respectively, are implied by) x p x∨y and y p x∨y where p denotes the covering relation of L.  
A lattice is modular if it is upper and lower semimodular. A distributive lattice is modular (but the 
converse is false). 
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v(x) + v(y) ≤ v(x∧y) + v(x∨y). 
For all (x, y) ∈ L2, set dv(x, y) = v(x) + v(y) – 2v(x∧y). 
A classic result40 says that a strictly isotone real function v on a meet semilattice L is 
a lower valuation if and only if dv is a distance on L. The following characterization of 
lower valuations [Leclerc, 1993] provides an upper bound to medians: 
THEOREM 5. A strictly isotone real function v on a meet semilattice L is a lower 
valuation if and only if, for any profile Π such that C′(Π) is not empty and for any Π-
median m with respect to the metric dv, the inequality m ≤ c′(Π) holds. 
Obviously, there exist dual results for join semilattices and upper valuations 
(v(x) + v(y) ≥ v(x∧y) + v(x∨y)) and the application of these results to lattices gives, for 
instance, the following result: 
THEOREM 6. A strictly isotone real function v on a finite lattice L is a valuation41 if and 
only if, for any profile Π and for any Π-median m with respect to the metric dv, the 
inequalities c(Π) ≤ m ≤ c′(Π) hold. 
We consider now the case of particular lower valuations called weight valuations. A 
real function v on a meet semilattice L is said to be a weight valuation if there exists a 
strictly positive real map w defined on the set J of its join-irreducible elements such that, 
for any x ∈ L, 
v(x) = ∑j∈J(x) w(j). 
It is easy to see that a weight valuation v on a meet semilattice is a lower valuation. 
The associated weight metric dv is given, for all (x, y) ∈ L2, by  
dv(x, y) = ∑j∈J(x)ΔJ(y) w(j). 
In particular, setting w(j) uniformly equal to 1, we get the lower valuation  
v(x) = |J(x)|, and the corresponding metric dv is nothing else than the metric δ of the 
symmetric difference defined above. The following result [Leclerc, 1994] provides upper 
bounds and intervals for medians. 
THEOREM 7. Let L be a finite meet semilattice endowed with a weight metric dv. 
For any profile Π such that b(Π) exists and for any median m of Π, the inequality 
m ≤ b(Π) holds. 
For any profile Π such that c(Π) exists and for any median m of Π, there exists a median 
m0 of Π such that: 
m0 ≤ c(Π); 
m0 ≤ m; 
all the elements of the lattice interval [m0, m] are medians. 
We consider now the case where the meet semilattice L is lower distributive 
(recall that it means that, for any x ∈ L, the set (x] = {y with y ≤ x} is a distributive 
lattice). In this case, Leclerc [1994] first shows that a weight valuation v on L is 
characterized by the fact that it is strictly isotone and that, for all (x, y) ∈ L2 such that x∨y 
                                                
40 See [Monjardet, 1981] for a survey on such results.  
41 A strictly isotone real function v on a lattice L is a valuation if it satisfies v(x∧y) + v(x∨y) = v(x) + v(y). 
The existence of such a valuation characterizes the modular lattices.  
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exists, we have v(x∧y) + v(x∨y) = v(x) + v(y). Then, he extends the previous result on 
medians (with respect to the distance δ) in median semilattices to this case: 
THEOREM 8. Let L be a finite lower distributive semilattice and Π ∈ Ln be a profile 
such that c(Π) exists, and let v be a weight valuation on L. Then, if n is an odd number, 
c(Π) is the unique median. If n is even, the set of all the Π-medians with respect to the 
metric dv is Meddv(Π) = {∨K: C(Π) ⊆ K ⊆ B(Π) and ∨K exists}. 
Observe that, in a lower distributive semilattice and contrary to a median 
semilattice, the element c(Π) may not exist. Nevertheless, it is possible to give a way to 
search medians in this case. 
Obviously, all the previous results can be applied to “concrete” objects. It suffices 
that the set of all the considered objects can be endowed with a (semi)latticial structure. 
It is the case for many sets of relations (like orders or equivalences), for many sets of 
classifications (like partitions or hierarchies), for many sets of maps (like fuzzy 
preorders, choice functions or ultrametrics). Then, to apply the previous results, it 
suffices to determine the latticial properties of these ordered sets. In some cases, one 
can also obtain specific results. The example below illustrates such a situation. 
Let O be the set of all the orders defined on a set X endowed with the inclusion 
relation. The partially ordered set O is a lower locally distributive meet semilattice42 
[Leclerc, 2003]. Using the above results on medians with respect to a weight metric, we 
can for instance obtain that the covering relation of any median order of a profile of 
orders is formed of majority ordered pairs (a generalization of a result on median linear 
orders in [Monjardet, 1973]). On the other hand, a classic and desirable property for a 
consensus rule is the Pareto property, requiring that the consensus order keeps the 
unanimous preferences. In the latticial context, this property translates into the 
following form. A consensus rule on a semilattice L has the Pareto property if for any 
profile Π = (x1, x2, …, xn) ∈ Ln and for any consensus element m, ∧i∈N xi ≤ m holds. In 
[Leclerc, 2003], it is shown that the median rule for orders with respect to the 
symmetric difference distance δ satisfies the Pareto property but that this property is not 
satisfied with respect to other weight metrics. The same is true for partitions 
[Barthélemy and Leclerc, 1995]. Still in [Leclerc, 2003], many similar results may be 
found concerning the Pareto property for various metrics and various semilattices. 
Observe for instance that Leclerc’s characterization of upper semimodular lattice given 
above (by the inequality c(Π) ≤ m for any Π-median m, with respect to the distance δ) 
shows that in this case the median rule has the Pareto property (a result first obtained by 
Barthélemy [1981]). Barthélemy [1976] proves Paretian properties for metric 
procedures defined on large classes of binary relations by remoteness functions 
satisfying monotonicity properties. 
Coming back to the axiomatic approach, we can search to provide an axiomatic 
characterization of median rules. As already said, the first such result was obtained by 
Young and Levenglick [1978] for the case of the median rule (with respect to the 
symmetric difference distance δ) for linear orders. Barthélemy and Janowitz [1991] 
characterized the median rule (with respect to δ) on median semilattices by the 
                                                
42 A lower locally distributive meet semilattice is a meet semilattice such that all its principal ideals (x] 
are lower locally distributive lattices. A lower locally distributive lattice can be defined for instance by 
the fact that for any x ∈ L, the interval [∧{y ∈ L: y p x}, x] is a Boolean lattice. 
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consistency property (see footnote 29) and four other properties. Their result was 
improved by McMorris, Mulder and Powers [2000] who use only the consistency 
property and two other properties. 
Another abstract approach to the aggregation problem was initiated by Guilbaud 
[1952] as early as 1952. Indeed, in his paper “Les théories de l’intérêt général et le 
problème logique de l’agrégation”, Guilbaud considers the aggregation of individual 
opinions (or judgments) consisting of the answers “yes” or “no” to a series of questions. 
In other terms, the opinion of an individual (for instance, a judge) is the set of 
valuations 0 or 1 given to a set of binary propositions. When these propositions are 
logically connected, it is assumed that these valuations respect the connexions. For 
instance, if proposition p implies proposition q, then an answer “yes” to p implies an 
answer “yes” to q. So, Guilbaud searches independent and neutral aggregation rules 
such that the collective judgment always respects the same connexions as the individual 
judgments. And the answer is that they are only the dictatorships for which the 
collective judgment is the judgment of one individual. A reconstruction of Guilbaud’s 
proof and historical considerations on his paper can be found in Eckert and Monjardet 
(2010). One can observe that in this paper Guilbaud appears as a precursor of the so-
called judgment aggregation considerably developed in the last years. 
8. ALGORITHMIC AND COMPLEXITY ISSUES 
As said in the introduction, the algorithmic complexity of a method plays an important 
role. It is usual to distinguish between polynomial problems and NP-hard ones. Let us 
remind that a problem is polynomial when there exists a polynomial method to solve it. 
On the opposite, the practical consequence of the NP-hardness of a problem is that none 
polynomial method is known to solve it exactly; so, solving such a problem exactly 
may require a CPU time which may increase exponentially with the size of the 
instances to solve (for more details upon the theory of algorithmic complexity and the 
theory of NP-completeness, see for instance [Barthélemy, Cohen and Lobstein, 1996] 
or [Garey and Johnson, 1979]). 
The computation of median linear orders is a problem which can be modelled as a 
particular case of the linear ordering problem43 and so as a 0-1 linear program (see, for 
instance [Reinelt, 1985] or [Charon and Hudry, 2010]). It has been shown to be NP-
hard (see below). This fact induces that exact methods giving the median orders do not 
allow solving large (with respect to the number of alternatives) problems44. These 
methods are mainly based on branch and bound methods. For instance, Bermond and 
Kodratoff [1976], then Barthélemy, Guénoche and Hudry [1989] provide branch and 
bound algorithms later improved with the help of some theoretical results in [Charon et 
al., 1992(b), 1996(a), 1997(a), 2006(a)]. When these methods cannot be applied, 
                                                
43 This problem includes also a representation of Slater’s problem. This one consists in searching a linear 
order fitting a tournament at best. And indeed the search of a median order can be stated as the search of 
a linear order fitting a weighted tournament at best (see Section 5). 
44 It is difficult to give a specific value, since the performances of the algorithms much depend on the 
considered instances and on the used computer. For example, the software available at the Web address 
http://www.enst.fr/~charon/tournament/median.html can deal with instances simulating some real data 
with 100 candidates in about 1 second. Random instances seem more difficult to solve (see [Charon and 
Hudry, 2006(a)]). 
CONSENSUS THEORIES. AN ORIENTED SURVEY 
 
159 
another possibility is to look for approximate solutions, with the hope to compute 
“good” solutions in a “reasonable” time. Some of these heuristics are specific to the 
considered problem (see [Charon and Hudry, 2010] for a survey). Other methods come 
from metaheuristics (general approximate methods) such as simulated annealing, tabu 
search, noising methods, genetic algorithms or even some hybridization between these 
different methods (once again, see [Charon and Hudry, 2010] for a survey). They have 
been used for instance in [Hudry, 1989], [Charon and Hudry, 1998, 2009]. If the quality 
of some specific heuristics may decrease quite fast with the size of the considered 
instance, metaheuristics seem to provide good results in a limited amount of 
computation time. 
The computation of a median partition is also a NP-hard problem [Barthélemy 
and Leclerc, 1995]45. This problem can be modelled as an instance of another NP-hard 
problem known as the clique partitioning problem. Here also, metaheuristics can be 
applied to compute medians partitions. For instance, de Amorim, Barthélemy and 
Ribeiro [1992] apply simulated annealing and Tabu search to this problem. Charon and 
Hudry [1993, 2006(b), 2007(b), 2009] provide a metaheuristic based on their noising 
method (a metaheuristic which generalizes simulated annealing and threshold accepting 
methods, see [Charon and Hudry, 2001, 2002]). For other approaches, see the survey 
[Barthélemy and Leclerc, 1995]. 
The complexities of the tournament solutions depicted in Section 5 are 
summarized in the following theorems (see [Hudry, 2009(b)] for more details and for 
complexity results about other tournament solutions; a more general survey on the 
complexity of voting procedures can be found in [Hudry 2009(a)]). 
THEOREM 9. Let T be a tournament with n vertices. 
Computing the Copeland winners of T can be done in O(n2). 
Computing a Banks winner can be done in O(n2) [Hudry, 2004]. 
THEOREM 10. The following problems are NP-complete: 
Given a tournament T and a vertex x of T, is x a Banks winner of T? [Woeginger, 2003]. 
Given a tournament T and an integer k, is the Slater index i(T) of T less than or equal 
to k? (see [Hudry, 2010], based on the results obtained independently by [Alon, 2006], 
[Charbit, Thomasse and Yeo, 2007] and [Conitzer, 2006]). 
THEOREM 11. The following problems are NP-hard: 
Given a tournament T, compute all the Banks winners of T. 
Given a tournament T, compute the Slater index i(T) of T. 
Given a tournament T, compute a Slater winner of T. 
Given a tournament T, compute all the Slater winners of T. 
Given a tournament T and a vertex x of T, is x a Slater winner of T? 
Given a tournament T, compute a Slater order of T. 
Given a tournament T, compute all the Slater orders of T. 
                                                
45 More precisely, the problem is NP-hard when the number of partitions to aggregate is not fixed, and its 
status is not known for a fixed value of this number. 
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THEOREM 12. The following problem belongs to co-NP: 
Given a tournament T = (X, A) and a linear order O defined on X, is O a Slater order of 
T? 
We may note that it is possible to compute a Banks winner in polynomial time 
while checking that a given vertex is a Banks winner is NP-hard; there is no 
contradiction, because we do not choose the Banks winner that we may compute in 
polynomial time (see [Guénoche, 1996] for an – exponential – algorithm computing all 
the Banks winners of a tournament). Note also that the decision problem of Theorem 11 
is not known to belong to NP, and that the problem of Theorem 12 is conjectured to be 
co-NP-complete in [Hudry, 2010]. 
To finish this section, we consider the aggregation of linear orders into median 
relations. The case of a median relation which must be a linear order is the most studied 
(see [Bartholdi, Tovey and Trick, 1989], [Dwork et al., 2001], [Hemaspaandra et al., 
2005], [Hudry, 1989 and 2008]; see [Charon and Hudry, 2010] for more general 
references on the properties of median linear orders). 
THEOREM 13. The following problems are NP-hard:  
Let m be an even integer greater than or equal to 4; given a profile Π of m linear 
orders, compute a median linear order of Π. 
Given a profile Π of m linear orders defined on a set X with n elements with m odd and 
m large enough (at least about n2), compute a median linear order of Π. 
The aggregation of two linear orders into a median linear order is a polynomial 
problem. 
In other words, the aggregation of m linear orders into a median linear order is 
NP-hard when the number m of voters is large enough. More precisely, it is NP-hard for 
any fixed even value of m with m ≥ 4, but the minimum odd value of m such that this 
problem is NP-hard is not known. 
Theorem 13 can be generalized into two directions. On the one hand, the same 
results apply if we consider a profile of any kind of preferences containing linear orders 
as special cases (for instance, profiles of orders, or of preorders, or of binary relations, 
and so on). On the other hand, the variants for which we look for a median relation 
which would not be necessarily a linear order but another kind of partially ordered 
relation often remain also NP-hard when m is large enough (see also [Wakabayashi, 
1986 and 1998] where the aggregation of binary relations into different types of median 
relations is studied): 
THEOREM 14. The aggregation of m linear orders into a median relation is an NP-
hard problem [Hudry, 1989, 2008, submitted] when:  
– the median relation must be an acyclic relation46, a complete preorder (see footnote 
8) or a weak order47 and m is any fixed even value with m ≥ 4 or m takes an odd 
value large enough (at least about n2); 
                                                
46 An acyclic relation is a relation without directed cycle. 
47 Here, a weak order is defined as the asymmetric part of any complete preorder. 
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– the median relation must be an interval order48, a semiorder49 or a quasi-order50 
and m takes a value large enough (at least about n2 for even values of m, or at least 
about n4 for odd values of m). 
Note that, when not trivial, the complexity of the above problems is not known 
for values of m less than the ones stated in Theorem 14. Note also that the complexity 
of the aggregation of linear orders into a median order or a median preorder remains 
unknown. 
On the other hand, the next theorem can be obtained as a corollary of Section 6: 
THEOREM 15. The aggregation of single-peaked linear orders into a median relation 
is a polynomial problem when the median relation must be a linear order. 
Indeed in this case majority rule provides median linear orders. 
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